Foundations: General Theory and Art of Interpretation

Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher

FRIEDRICH (DANIEL ERNST) SCHLEIERMACHER (1768–1834), the founder of modern Protestant theology, was also a respected classical philologist (best known through his work on Plato) and an original thinker in his own right. His interest in hermeneutic problems was first kindled when he lived in Berlin in close personal contact with Friedrich Schlegel and the other Romantics (1796–1802). Among his group, Schlegel was the first to apply the principles of transcendental idealism to the realm of literature with his Philosophy of Philology. Taking his cues from Schlegel's suggestive insights, Schleiermacher went to work in a consistent and systematic fashion, and thus became the founder of modern hermeneutics. By critically uniting the hermeneutic traditions in Protestant theology and the rhetorical and philological traditions of classical scholarship with the new transcendental approach inherited from Kant and Fichte, Schleiermacher created the "classical" system of Romantic hermeneutics. He wrote down his ideas first in aphoristic form (1805, 1809–10), subsequently elaborated a draft of his system, and finally produced a detailed outline of his ideas in 1819. This so-called Compendium of 1819 served Schleiermacher as the basis for the lecture course which he taught repeatedly over the years when he held his chair in Protestant theology at the University of Berlin between 1810 and 1834. In 1828 he added additional notes ("Marginal Notes") and comments to the original text. After Schleiermacher's death, his student, F. Lücke, published in 1838 a volume called Hermeneutics and Criticism which offered a coherent version of Schleiermacher's hermeneutics, composed of notes taken by students attending his lectures and of Schleiermacher's own notes and outlines. It was only in 1958 that Schleiermacher's manuscripts were published separately and in their entirety by one of Gadamer's students, H. Kimmerle. The text of the Lücke edition has recently been reissued (F. D. E. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik und Kritik, 1977. Sect. A, Bibl.). The selections are from the English translation by J. Duke and J. Forstman of the Kimmerle edition. They comprise the "Introduction," "Part 1: Grammatical Interpretation," and "Part 2: Technical Interpretation" of the Compendium of 1819, together with the marginal notes of 1828, which are reproduced here in smaller type following the passages to which they relate. A few short paragraphs which did not directly contribute to the main argument have been omitted from "Part 1."

[GENERAL HERMENEUTICS]

Introduction

I. 1. At present there is no general hermeneutics as the art of understanding but only a variety of specialized hermeneutics.* Ast's explanation, p. 172; Wolf, p. 37. $^{1}$

*1828

1. Hermeneutics and criticism are related such that the practice of either one presupposes the other.

In both, the relationship to the author is general and varied.

Hermeneutics is presumed to be unimportant because it is necessary where criticism is hardly applicable at all, in general because the task of criticism supposedly ends, whereas the task of hermeneutics is endless. The hermeneutical task moves constantly. My first sentence refers to this movement.

2. With respect to its study of both genre and language, special hermeneutics is only an aggregate of observations and does not meet the requirements to science. To seek understanding without reflection and to resort to the rules of understanding only in special cases is an unbalanced operation. Since one cannot do without either of these two standpoints, one must combine them. This occurs in two ways: (1) Even where we think we can proceed in an inartistic way we often encounter unexpected difficulties, the clues for the solution of which may be found in the materials already passed over. Therefore, we are always forced to pay attention to what may be able to resolve these problems. (2) If we always proceed artistically, we come at the end to an unconscious application of the rules, without ever having been inartistic.

3. Hermeneutics deals only with the art of understanding, not with the presentation of what has been understood. The presentation of what has been understood would be only one special part of the art of speaking and writing, and that part could be done only by relying upon general principles.

4. Nor is hermeneutics concerned exclusively with difficult passages of texts written in foreign languages. To the contrary, it presupposes a familiarity with both the contents and the language of a text. Assuming such familiarity, difficulties with particular passages of a text arise only because the easier ones have not been understood. Only an artistically sound understanding can follow what is being said and written.

5. It is commonly believed that by following general principles one can trust one's common sense. But if that is so, by following special principles, one can trust one's natural instincts.

6. It is very difficult to assign general hermeneutics its proper place among the sciences.

7. For a long time it was treated as an appendix to Logic, but since Logic is no longer seen as dealing with applied matters, this can no longer be done. The philosopher per se has no interest in developing hermeneutical theory. He seldom works at understanding, because he believes that it occurs by necessity. $^{2}$

8. Moreover, philology has become positivistic. Thus its way of treating hermeneutics results in a mere aggregate of observations.

9. Since the art of speaking and the art of understanding stand in relation to each other, speaking being only the outer side of thinking, hermeneutics is a part of the art of thinking, and is therefore philosophical.*

*General hermeneutics is related to criticism as to grammar. And since there can be no communication or even acquisition of knowledge without all three, and since all correct thinking is based on correct speaking, all three are related to dialectics.

1. Yet these two are to be related in such a way that the art of interpretation at once depends upon and presupposes composition. They are parallel in the sense that artless speaking does not require any art to be understood.

II. 4. Speaking is the medium for the communality of thought, and for this reason rhetoric and hermeneutics belong together and both are related to dialectics.

1. Indeed, a person thinks by means of speaking. Thinking matures by means of internal speech, and to that extent speaking is only developed thought. But whenever the thinker finds it necessary to fix what he has thought, there arises the art of speaking, that is, the transformation of original internal speaking, and interpretation becomes necessary.

2. Hermeneutics and rhetoric are intimately related in that every act of understanding is the reverse side of an act of speaking, and one must grasp the thinking that underlies a given statement.

Dialectics relies on hermeneutics and rhetoric because the development of all knowledge depends on both speaking and understanding.

5. Just as every act of speaking is related to both the totality of the language and the totality of the speaker's thoughts, so understanding a speech always involves two moments: to understand what is said in the context of the language with its possibilities, and to understand it as a fact in the thinking of the speaker.*

*3. Explanation of 5 and 6

How grammatical and psychological interpretation are related to dialectical and rhetorical thinking.

Each makes use of the other. Grammatical and psychological remain the main divisions.

1. Every act of speaking presupposes a given language. This statement could also be reversed, not only for the absolutely first act of speaking in a language, but also for its entire history, because language develops through speaking. In every case communication presupposes a shared language and therefore some knowledge of the language. Whenever something comes between the internal speaking and its communication, one must turn to the art of speaking. So the art of speaking is due in part to a speaker's anxiety that something in his use of language may be unfamiliar to the hearer.

2. Every act of speaking is based on something having been thought. This statement, too, could be reversed, but with respect to communication the first formulation holds because the art of understanding deals only with an advanced stage of thinking.

3. Accordingly, each person represents one locus where a given language takes shape in a particular way, and his speech can be understood only in the context of the totality of the language. But then too he is a person who is a constantly developing spirit, and his speaking can be understood as only one moment in this development in relation to all others.

4. Understanding takes place only in the coinherence of these two moments.

5. An act of speaking cannot even be understood as a moment in a person's development unless it is also understood in relation to the language. This is because the linguistic heritage [Angeborenheit der Sprache] modifies our mind.

6. Nor can an act of speaking be understood as a modification of the language unless it is also understood as a moment in the development of the person (later addition: because an individual is able to influence a language by speaking, which is how a language develops).

III. 7. These two hermeneutical tasks are completely equal, and it would be incorrect to label grammatical interpretation the “lower” and psychological interpretation the “higher” task.*

*On 7. There is no way to distinguish between what is easy or difficult in general terms. Rather, to one person the one task is easier; to another, the other. Consequently, there are two different main approaches and main works, notes on language and introductions.

4. Continuation of 7. Neither task is higher than the other. 6, 8, 9.

5. Psychological interpretation is higher when one regards the language exclusively as a means by which a person communicates his thoughts. Then grammatical interpretation is employed only to clear away initial difficulties.

6. Grammatical interpretation and language, because it conditions the thinking of every person, are higher only when one regards the person and his speaking exclusively as occasions for the language to reveal itself. Then psychological interpretation and the life of the individual become subordinate considerations.

7. From this dual relation it is evident that the two tasks are completely equal.

8. The task is finally resolved when either side could be replaced by the other, though both must be treated, that is to say, when each side is treated in such a way that the treatment of the other side produces no change in the result.

9. Both grammatical and psychological interpretation must be treated, even though either can substitute for the other, in accordance with II, 6.

10. Each side is complete only when it makes the other superfluous and contributes to its work. This is because language can be learned only by understanding what is spoken, and because the inner make-up of a person, as well as the way in which external objects affect him, can only be understood from his speaking.

11. Interpretation is an art.

12. Each side is itself an art. For each side constructs something finite and definite from something infinite and indefinite. Language is infinite because every element is determinable in a special way by the other elements.

This statement also applies to psychological interpretation, for every intuition of a person is itself infinite. Moreover, external influences on a person will have ramifications which trail off into infinity. Such a construction, however, cannot be made by means of rules which may be applied with self-evident certainty.

2. In order to complete the grammatical side of interpretation it would be necessary to have a complete knowledge of the language. In order to complete the psychological side it would be necessary to have a complete knowledge of the person. Since in both cases such complete knowledge is impossible, it is necessary to move back and forth between the grammatical and psychological sides, and no rules can stipulate exactly how to do this.

3. The success of the art of interpretation depends on one's linguistic competence and on one's ability for knowing people.

4. By “linguistic competence” I am not referring to a facility for learning foreign languages. The distinction between one’s mother tongue and a foreign language is not at issue here. Rather, I refer to one’s command of language, one’s sensitivity to its similarities and differences, etc. — It could be claimed that in this respect rhetoric and hermeneutics must always belong together. But hermeneutics requires one kind of competence, rhetoric requires another, and the two are not the same. To be sure, both hermeneutics and rhetoric require linguistic competence, but hermeneutics makes use of that competence in a different way.

5. One's ability to know people refers especially to a knowledge of the subjective element determining the composition of thoughts. Thus, just as with hermeneutics and rhetoric, so with hermeneutics and the artful description of persons, there is no permanent connection. Nonetheless, many errors in hermeneutics are due to a lack of this talent or to a flaw in its application.

6. Insofar as these abilities are universal gifts of nature, hermeneutics is everybody's concern. To the extent that a person is deficient in one of these talents, he is hampered, and the other gift can do no more than help him choose wisely from the suggestions made by others.

IV. 11. The art of interpretation is not equally interested in every act of speaking. Some instances fail to spark its interest at all, while others engage it completely. Most, however, fall somewhere between these two extremes.*

*Hour 5. 10–11.

On 11. Of minimal worth is such common speech as (a) business discussions [geschäftliche] and (b) conversations. Of maximal worth, predominately for language: (a) original [urbildlich] for the production of thoughts = too much. Those types of speech between these two extremes lie closer to one extreme or the other—(a) toward common speech, that is, with a relatively important subject matter and a graceful presentation; (b) toward creative [geniale] speech, the classical quality of the language need not be original, and the originality in the combination of elements need not be classical.

A great deal of talent is necessary not only to deal with difficult passages, but also in order not to be content with an immediate purpose, and to pursue both directions in order to reach the goal.

1. A statement may be regarded to be of no interest when it is neither important as a human act nor significant for the language. It is said because the language maintains itself only by constant repetition. But that which is only already available and repeated is itself of no significance. Conversations about the weather. But these statements are not absolutely devoid of significance, since they may be said to be “minimally significant,” in that they are constructed in the same way as more profound statements.

2. A statement may be of maximum significance for one side of interpretation or the other. It is maximally significant for the grammatical side when it is linguistically creative to an exceptional degree and minimally repetitive: classical texts. A statement is maximally significant for the psychological side when it is highly individualized and minimally commonplace: original texts. The term “absolute” is reserved for statements that achieve a maximum of both linguistic creativity and individuality: works of genius [das Genialische].

3. “Classical” and “original” statements cannot be transitory, but must be definitive for later productions. Indeed, even absolute texts are influenced to some degree by earlier and more common ones.

4. Although both sides of interpretation should always be applied, they will always be weighted differently.*

*6. 12 and 13 were begun.

[1]. This is because a statement that is grammatically insignificant is not necessarily psychologically insignificant and vice versa. Thus, in dealing with a text that is in one respect insignificant, we cannot reach what is significant in it by applying both sides equally.

2. A minimum of psychological interpretation is appropriate when what is to be interpreted is predominately objective. Pure history, especially in its details, whereas the overall viewpoint requires more psychological interpretation since it is always subjectively affected. Epics. Commercial records that can be used as historical sources. Didactic treatments in the strict sense on every subject. In such cases the subjective is not applied as a moment of interpretation, but results from the interpretation. A minimum of grammatical interpretation in conjunction with a maximum of psychological is appropriate in dealing with letters, especially personal letters. There is a point of transition along the continuum from historical and didactic pieces to personal letters. Lyric poetry. Polemics?

3. There are no methods of interpretation other than those discussed above.

4. For example, in the dispute over the historical interpretation of the New Testament there emerged the curious view that there are several different kinds of interpretation. To the contrary, only historical interpretation can do justice to the rootedness of the New Testament authors in their time and place. (Awkward expressions. Concepts of time.) But historical interpretation is wrong when it denies Christianity's power to create new concepts and attempts to explain it in terms of conditions which were already present in the time. It is proper to reject such a one-sided historical interpretation, but it is improper to reject historical interpretation altogether. $^{3}$ The crux of the matter, then, lies in the relationship between grammatical and psychological interpretation, since new concepts developed from the distinctive manner in which the authors were affected.

V. 2. Historical interpretation is not to be limited to gathering historical data. That task should be done even before interpretation begins, since it is the means for re-creating the relationship between speaker and the original audience, and interpretation cannot begin until that relationship has been established.

3. Allegorical interpretation does not deal with allegories where the figurative meaning is the only one intended, regardless of whether the stories are based on truth, as in the parable of the sower, or on fiction, as in the parable of the rich man, but to cases where the literal meaning, in its immediate context, gives rise to a second, figurative meaning. Such instances cannot be dismissed by citing the general principle that a given passage can have only one meaning, that is, its usual grammatical one. Allusions always involve a second meaning, and if a reader does not catch this second meaning along with the first, he misses one of the intended meanings, even though he may be able to follow the literal one. At the same time, to claim that there is an allusion where there actually is none is also an error. An allusion occurs when an additional meaning is so entwined with the main train of thought that the author believes it would be easily recognized by another person. These additional meanings are not merely occasional and unimportant, but just as the whole world is posited ideally in man, it is always considered real, although only as a dark shadow-image. There is a parallelism of different stages [Reihen] in the large and the small, and therefore there can occur in any one something from another: parallelism of the physical and the ethical of music and painting. But these parallelisms are to be noted only when figurative expressions indicate them. There is a special reason why parallelism occurs without clues, especially in Homer and in the Bible.*

testaments, the type of explanation used in interpreting the Old Testament was applied to the New Testament as well, and this type of interpretation was carried over into scholarly interpretations. The second principle was the idea, more thoroughly applied to the New Testament than to the Old, that the Holy Spirit was the author. Since the Holy Spirit could not be conceived as an individual consciousness that changed in time, there arose a tendency to find everything in each part. Universal truths or particular instructions satisfy this inclination, but the results which are produced are in the main unconnected and, taken in isolation, insignificant.

4. Incidentally, the question arises whether on account of the Holy Spirit the Scriptures must be treated in a special way. This question cannot be answered by a dogmatic decision about inspiration, because such a decision itself depends upon interpretation.

5. We must not make a distinction between what the apostles spoke and what they wrote, for the church had to be built on their speeches.

6. But for this reason we must not suppose that their writings were addressed to all of Christendom, for in fact each text was addressed to specific people, and their writings could not be properly understood in the future unless these first readers could understand them. But these first readers would have looked for what was specifically related to their own situations, and from this material they had to derive the whole truth of Christianity. Our interpretation must take this fact into account, and we must assume that even if the authors had been merely passive tools of the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit could have spoken through them only as they themselves would have spoken.*

*Whether the view that everything in the Scriptures was inspired means that everything must relate to the whole church? No. This view would necessarily entail that the original recipients would interpret them incorrectly, so that it would have been better if the Holy Spirit had not produced the Scriptures as occasional writings. Therefore, grammatical and psychological interpretation always proceed in accord with the general rules. To what extent a specialized hermeneutics is still required cannot be discussed until later.

VII. 5. The worst offender in this respect is cabalistic interpretation which labors to find everything in the particular elements and their signs. —One sees that whatever efforts can be legitimately called interpretation, there are no other types except those based on the different relationships between the two sides we have noted.

14. The distinction between artful and artless interpretation is not based on the difference between what is familiar to us and what is unfamiliar, or between what is spoken and what is written. Rather, it is based on the fact that we want to understand with precision some things and not others.*

*14–16. We stand at the point of total opposition between artless and artful interpretation. If one moves to the latter only when difficulties are encountered, one will come to no more than discrete observations. —Precise understanding means that one grasps the easy parts of the meaning and uses them as a key for interpreting the difficult parts.

1. Were the art of interpretation needed only for foreign and ancient texts, then the original readers would not have required it. Were this the case, then in effect the art of interpretation would be based on the differences between the original readers and us. But historical and linguistic knowledge removes that obstacle, and so only after significant points of comparison between the first readers and us have been reached can interpretation begin. Therefore, the only difference between ancient and foreign texts and contemporary texts in our own language is that the comparisons necessary for interpreting the former cannot be completed prior to the interpretation but begins and is completed with the process of interpretation. As he works the interpreter should keep this fact in mind.

2. Nor do written texts alone call for the art of interpretation. Were that true, the art would be necessary only because of the difference between written and spoken words, that is, because of the loss of the living voice and the absence of supplementary personal impressions. But the latter must themselves be interpreted, and that interpretation is never certain. To be sure, the living voice facilitates understanding, and a writer must take this fact into consideration. Were he to do so, then, on the assumption that the art of interpretation is not necessary for oral statements, the art would not be necessary for the written text. But that simply is not the case. Therefore, even if an author did not consider the effects of the living voice, the necessity for the art of interpretation is not based on the difference between oral and written statements.*

*That the art is necessary more for spoken than written language, because as the speech is spoken one cannot remember the various rules which are to be used.

3. Given this relationship between speaking and writing, the distinction between artful and artless interpretation must be based on nothing else than the principle stated above, and it follows that artistic interpretation has the same aim as we do in ordinary listening.

VIII. 15. There is a less rigorous practice of this art which is based on the assumption that understanding occurs as a matter of course. The aim of this practice may be expressed in negative form as: “misunderstanding should be avoided.”

1. This less rigorous practice presupposes that it deals mainly with insignificant matters or that it has a quite specific interest, and so it establishes limited, easily realizable goals.

2. Even here, however, difficulties may necessitate recourse to artful interpretation. In this way hermeneutics originated from artless practice. But because it was applied only to difficult cases, it produced merely a collection of observations. At the same time this practice gave rise to special hermeneutics, since difficult passages could be more easily worked out within a delimited framework. Both theological and juristic hermeneutics arose in this way, $^{4}$ and even the philologists have pursued only specialized aims.

3. In short, the less rigorous practice is based on the fact that the speaker and hearer share a common language and a common way of formulating thoughts.

4. There is a more rigorous practice of the art of interpretation that is based on the assumption that misunderstanding occurs as a matter of course, and so understanding must be willed and sought at every point.

5. This more rigorous practice consists in grasping the text precisely with the understanding and in viewing it from the standpoint of both grammatical and psychological interpretation.

(Note: It is common experience that one notices no distinction until . . . [the] beginning of a misunderstanding.)

2. Therefore, this more rigorous practice presupposes that the speaker and hearer differ in their use of language and in their ways of formulating thoughts, although to be sure there is an underlying unity between them. This is one of the less significant matters overlooked by artless interpretation.*

*9. Discuss the difference (pistis) between the subjective interpretation and the objective as such.

17. Both qualitative misunderstanding of the contents of a work and quantitative misunderstanding of its tone are to be avoided.*

*17. Negative formulation of the task: to avoid misunderstanding the material and formal elements.

1. Objective qualitative misunderstanding occurs when one part of speech in the language is confused with another, as for example, when the meanings of two words are confused. Subjective qualitative misunderstanding occurs when the reference of an expression is confused.

2. Subjective quantitative misunderstanding occurs when one misses the potential power of development of a part of speech or the value given it by the speaker. Analogous to this, objective quantitative misunderstanding occurs when one mistakes the degree of importance which a part of speech has.

3. From quantitative misunderstanding, which usually receives less consideration, qualitative always develops.

4. This thesis (17) encompasses the full task of interpretation, but because it is stated negatively we cannot develop rules from it. In order to develop rules we must work from a positive thesis, but we must constantly be oriented to this negative formulation.

5. We must also distinguish between passive and active misunderstanding. The latter occurs when one reads something into a text because of one's own bias. In such a case the author's meaning cannot possibly emerge.*

*Hour 10. 17,5. This represents the maximum, because it is caused by completely false presuppositions. —18. 19.

IX. 18. The rules for the art of interpretation must be developed from a positive formula, and this is: “the historical and divinatory, objective and subjective reconstruction of a given statement.”

1. “Objective-historical” means to consider the statement in [its] relation to the language as a whole, and to consider the knowledge it contains as a product of the language. — “Objective-prophetic” means to sense how the statement itself will stimulate further developments in the language. Only by taking both of these aspects into account can qualitative and quantitative misunderstanding be avoided.

2. “Subjective-historical” means to know how the statement, as a fact in the person’s mind, has emerged. “Subjective-prophetic” means to sense how the thoughts contained in the statement will exercise further influence on and in the author. Here, again, unless both of these aspects are taken into account, qualitative and quantitative misunderstandings are unavoidable.

3. The task is to be formulated as follows: "To understand the text at first as well as and then even better than its author." Since we have no direct knowledge of what was in the author's mind, we must try to become aware of many things of which he himself may have been unconscious, except insofar as he reflects on his own work and becomes his own reader. Moreover, with respect to the objective aspects, the author had no data other than we have.

4. So formulated, the task is infinite, because in a statement we want to trace a past and a future which stretch into infinity. Consequently, inspiration is as much a part of this art as of any other. Inasmuch as a text does not evoke such inspiration, it is insignificant. — The question of how far and in which directions interpretation will be pressed must be decided in each case on practical grounds. Specialized hermeneutics and not general hermeneutics must deal with these questions.

5. Before the art of hermeneutics can be practiced, the interpreter must put himself both objectively and subjectively in the position of the author.

6. On the objective side this requires knowing the language as the author knew it. But this is a more specific task than putting oneself in the position of the original readers, for they, too, had to identify with the author. On the subjective side this requires knowing the inner and the outer aspects of the author's life.

7. These two sides can be completed only in the interpretation itself. For only from a person's writings can one learn his vocabulary, and so, too, his character and his circumstances.

8. The vocabulary and the history of an author's age together form a whole from which his writings must be understood as a part, and vice versa.

9. Complete knowledge always involves an apparent circle, that each part can be understood only out of the whole to which it belongs, and vice versa. All knowledge which is scientific must be constructed in this way.

10. To put oneself in the position of an author means to follow through with this relationship between the whole and the parts. Thus it follows, first, that the more we learn about an author, the better equipped we are for interpretation, but, second, that a text can never be understood right away. On the contrary, every reading puts us in a better position to understand because it increases our knowledge. Only in the case of insignificant texts are we satisfied with what we understand on first reading.

X. 21. An interpreter who gains all his knowledge of an author's vocabulary from lexical aids and disconnected observations can never reach an independent interpretation.*

*Hour 11. 19, 20, 21, 22. I only began 22. Neither 21 nor 22 were applied to the New Testament.

Hour 12. Apply 21 and 22 to the New Testament.

1. The only source independent of interpretation for knowing an author's vocabulary is the immediate, living heritage of the language. With Greek and Latin that source is incomplete. That is why the first lexicographical works, which searched the whole literature in order to learn about the language, were put together. Consequently, these dictionaries must be constantly emended by interpretation itself, and every artful interpretation must contribute to that end.

2. By the "vocabulary" of an author I include the dialect, sentence structure, and type of language characteristic of a given genre, the latter beginning with the distinction between poetry and prose.

3. Various aids may be indispensable for a beginner's first steps, but an independent interpretation demands that the interpreter acquire his background knowledge through independent research. All of the information about a language which dictionaries and other resource works supply represents the product of particular and often questionable interpretations.

4. In New Testament studies, especially, it can be said that the questionableness and arbitrariness of interpretation is due in large measure to this failure. For references to particular observations can lead to contradictory results. — The road to comprehending the language of the New Testament leads one from classical antiquity through (a) Macedonian Greek, (b) the Jewish secular writers (Josephus and Philo), (c) the deuterocanonical writings, and (d) the Septuagint, which is closest to Hebrew.

5. An interpreter who gains his historical knowledge solely from prolegomena cannot reach an independent interpretation.

6. Any editor who wants to be helpful should provide such prolegomena, in addition to the usual critical aids. Preparing such prolegomena requires a knowledge of the whole circle of literature to which a writing belongs and of everything that has been written about a given author. For this reason these prolegomena themselves depend on interpretation, and . . . at the same time how they were compiled may be irrelevant to the aim of the reader. The precise interpreter, however, must gradually derive all of his conclusions from the sources themselves. Thus he must proceed from the easier to the more difficult passages. A dependence on prolegomena is most damaging when one takes conclusions from them that should have been derived from the original sources.

7. In New Testament studies a separate discipline has been created to deal with this background information, the Introduction. The Introduction is not truly an organic part of the theological sciences, but it does serve a practical purpose for both the beginner and the master, because it is helpful to have all the previous research on a given topic collected in one place. But the interpreter must contribute to extending and verifying this information.

others are to be assessed. Likewise, in technical interpretation, one should try to identify the basic train of thought by reference to which particular ideas may be more readily recognized. That these tasks are indispensable for both technical and grammatical interpretation can be easily seen from the various types of misunderstanding.

4. It is not necessary to gain an overview of insignificant texts, and although an overview seems to offer little help in dealing with difficult texts, it is nonetheless indispensable. It is characteristic of difficult authors that an overview is of little help.*

*13. 23. General rule for the method: (a) Begin with a general overview of the text. (b) Comprehend it by moving in both directions simultaneously. (c) Only when the two coincide for one passage does one proceed to another passage. (d) When the two do not agree, it is necessary to go back until the error in calculation is found.

Whenever we are actually engaged in the interpretation of a particular text, we must always hold the two sides of interpretation together. But in setting forth the theory of hermeneutics we must separate them and discuss the two separately. Nonetheless, each side of interpretation must be developed so thoroughly that the other becomes indispensable, or better, that the results of the two coincide. Grammatical interpretation comes first.

[GRAMMATICAL AND TECHNICAL INTERPRETATION]

Part I: Grammatical Interpretation

XII. 1. First canon: A more precise determination of any point in a given text must be decided on the basis of the use of language common to the author and his original public.

1. Every point needs to be more precisely defined, and that determination is first of all provided by the context. Considered in isolation, every element of language, both formal and material, is indefinite. For any given word or linguistic form we can conceive a certain range [Cyclus] of usages.

2. Some term what a word is thought to mean “in and of itself” its meaning [Bedeutung] and what the word is thought to mean in a given context its “sense” [Sinn]. Others argue that a word can have only a single meaning [Bedeutung] and not a sense [Sinn]; that a sentence regarded in isolation has a sense [Sinn], but not a purport [Verstand], for only a complete text has a purport. Of course, it could be claimed that even a whole text would be more completely understood in the context of its entire world, but this consideration leads us beyond the sphere of interpretation altogether. — The latter terminology is certainly preferable inasmuch as a sentence is an inseparable unity and as such its sense [Sinn] is also a unity, that is, there is a mutual co-determination of its subject and predicate. Nonetheless, this terminology is not adequate to linguistic usage. For with reference to the purport [Verstand] of a text, meaning and sense are identical. The truth is that in interpretation the task of clarifying what is vague, is never-ending. — When a given sentence is a self-enclosed whole, the distinction between sense and purport seems to disappear, as in the case of epigrams and maxims. This whole, however, must be determined by the reader: each reader has to puzzle through such statements as best he can. The meaning is decided by reference to the particular subject matter.

3. The era in which an author lives, his development, his involvements, his way of speaking—whenever these factors make a difference in a finished text—constitute his “sphere.” But this sphere cannot be found in toto in every text, for it varies according to the kind of reader the author had in mind. But how do we determine who these readers were? Only by a cursory reading of the entire text. But determining the sphere common to the author and the readers is only the first step. It must be continued throughout the process of interpretation, and it is completed only when the interpretation itself is concluded.

4. There are several apparent exceptions to the rule.

a. Archaic expressions lie beyond the immediate linguistic sphere of the author and his readers. They serve the purpose of making the past contemporaneous with the present; they are used in writing more than in speaking, in poetry more than in prose.

b. Technical expressions occur in even the most common forms of speaking, as, for example, in legal proceedings, even though not everyone understands them. This fact leads us to observe that an author does not always have his entire public in mind, but only certain sectors of it. Consequently, the application of this rule requires a certain amount of

art, since it depends on the interpreter's sensitivity [richtige Gefühle]. XIV. 5. The statement that we must consciously grasp an author's linguistic sphere, in contrast to other organic aspects of his language, implies that we understand the author better than he understood himself. Both in our general survey and in our work on particular passages difficulties arise, and we must become aware of many things of which the author himself was unaware. 6. By drawing on our general survey of the work, interpretation may continue smoothly for some time without actually being artless, because everything is held together in a general picture. But as soon as some detail causes us difficulty, we begin to wonder whether the problem lies with the author or with us. We may assume that the author is at fault only when our overview of the text uncovers evidence that the author is careless and imprecise, or confused and without talent. Our own errors may be caused in two ways. We may have made an early mistake in understanding that had continued unnoticed, or our knowledge of the language might be inadequate. In either case, the correct word usage does not occur to us. I will discuss the former later, because it is related to the use of parallel passages. I want to discuss the latter now.

7. Dictionaries, which are the normal resources for supplementing our knowledge of a language, view the various usages of a word as a many-faceted, loosely-bound aggregate. They do not trace the meaning [Bedeutung] back to its original unity, because to do so would require that the material be arranged according to the system of concepts, and this is impossible. The multiplicity of meanings, then, is to be analyzed into a series of distinctions. The first is the distinction between the literal and the figurative. Upon closer scrutiny this distinction disappears. In similes two parallel series of thoughts are connected. Each word stands in its own series and should be determined only in those terms. Therefore, it retains its own meaning. In metaphors this connection is only suggested, and often only a single aspect of the concept is emphasized. For example, coma arborum is foliage, but coma still means hair. And we speak of the lion as the king of the animals. But a lion does not govern, and kings are not entitled to devour others on the principle that “might makes right.” Such a single usage of the word has no meaning, and usually the entire phrase must be given. This distinction may be ultimately traced to the belief that not all non-literal [geistliche] meanings are original, but that they are imagistic usages of words that had sense-referents. XV. But this question lies beyond the sphere of hermeneutics. Even if theos (God) is derived from theō, this fact would not be immediately evident in the language because it arose in the primitive history of the language, with which hermeneutics does not deal. The question is whether non-literal ideas [geistliche Vorstellungen] are a second shape of development that does not begin until after the language has been formed, and there does not seem to be any answer to that question. It is undeniable that there are non-literal words which at the same time signify sense-objects, but a parallelism governs these cases in that both, as they present themselves to us, are included in the idea of one living whole. This accounts, too, for the use of the same words for matters relating to space and time. The two meanings are essentially the same because we can determine space only by reference to time, and vice versa. Terms for form and movement are also interchangeable, and so a “creeping plant” is not a figurative expression. There are just as many problems with the distinction between original and derived meanings. In Latin hostis originally meant “stranger,” but it came to mean “enemy.” Originally all strangers were enemies. Later it became possible to be friendly with foreigners, and people instinctively decided that the word had referred more to a difference of disposition than to a distance of space. One could therefore speak of certain fellow citizens as hostes [enemies], but perhaps only those who had been exiled. People also make a distinction between general and specific meanings, the former occurring in ordinary conversation and the latter in special areas of discussion. Often these meanings are basically the same, or elliptical. Thus, the word “foot” stands for a measurement of length or a unit of poetry, or for a step, or a step forward. The difference between general and particular meanings, then, develops because the terminology used in a special discipline takes on a more general meaning when used by groups of people who do not understand it precisely. Frequently, too, foreign words become garbled and remolded until they seem to be native words. All of the other distinctions about word-meanings arise in similar ways.

8. The basic task, even for dictionaries designed specifically for interpreters, is to identify the true and complete unity of a given word. Of course, the occurrence of a word in a given passage involves an infinite, indeterminate multiplicity. The only way to grasp the unity of a word within such a multiplicity of usages is to consider the multiplicity as a clearly circumscribed grouping with a unity of its own. Such a unity in turn must break up into distinctions. But a word is never isolated, even when it occurs by itself, for its determination is not derived from itself, but from its context. We need only to relate this contextual use to this original unity in order to discover the correct meaning in each case. But to find the complete unity of a word would be to explain it, and that is as difficult as completely explaining objects. The elements of dead languages cannot be fully explained because we are not yet in a position to trace their whole development, and those of living languages cannot be explained because they are still developing.

XVI. 9. Granting that a multiplicity of usages is possible with an existing unity, then a multiplicity must already be present in the unity: several major points are bound together as variables within certain limits. One's linguistic sense must be attentive to this, and when uncertainties arise, reference to a dictionary can help orient us to what is known about the word. The various instances cited in the dictionary should be regarded merely as a reasonable selection. One must connect the various citations in order to bring into view the full range of the word and to determine the meaning of a given usage. 10. The same holds for the formal element. The rules of grammar are just like the meanings cited in a dictionary. Thus, in dealing with particles, a grammar serves as a dictionary. It is even more difficult, however, to deal with the formal elements of the language.

11. To use these aids is in effect to make use of another author, and so all of the rules of interpretation apply here as well. These two resources represent only a certain segment of our knowledge of a language, and usually each is written from a definite point of view. Therefore, in the use of these aids a scholar will make corrections and additions in order to reach a better understanding. All of his work should contribute to this end.

12. Second Canon. The meaning of each word of a passage must be determined by the context in which it occurs.

13. The first canon serves only to exclude certain possibilities. This second canon, however, seems to be determinative, a "jump" which must be justified.

a. One moves from the first canon to the second. Each word has a determinative linguistic sphere. In explaining a word we use only what we believe can be expected to occur within that linguistic sphere. Similarly, the whole text more or less forms the context and surroundings of each passage.

b. Likewise, one moves from the second canon to the first. When the given connection of subject, predicate, and supplementary words is not sufficient to explain the meaning, one must turn to other passages where these same words occur and under certain conditions, to other works of the author or even to works written by others in which these words appear. But one must always remain within the same linguistic sphere.

2. Consequently, the distinction we have made between the two canons, that the first is exclusive and the second determinative, is more apparent than real. In each particular case this second canon, too, only excludes certain possibilities. Every modifier excludes a certain number of otherwise possible meanings, and the determination of the word emerges by a process of elimination. Since the application of this canon, carried to its farthest extent, involves the entire theory of parallel passages, these two canons comprise the whole of grammatical interpretation.

XXI. 3. We must now discuss how to determine the formal and material elements, and we must deal with both in a way that draws on the immediate context and on parallels, and aims at both qualitative and quantitative understanding. Either set of divisions may be made the major basis for organizing the discussion. But the first is the most natural, because it is a two-way road that runs through the entire operation.

4. The use of parallel passages as a resource is only an apparent extension of the canon, and the use of parallel passages is limited by the canon. For a passage is “parallel” only when it can be considered, with respect to the point in question, as identical with the sentence itself, and so can be considered part of a unified context.

5. Granting that the formal and material elements constitute the major divisions of our discussion, it is best to begin by considering how to determine the formal element, because our understanding of a given passage is related to our preliminary understanding of the whole, and the sentence is recognized as a unity only through the formal element.

6. On determining the formal element.*

*1828. I have already dealt with the material element.

We must divide formal elements into those that combine sentences and those that combine parts of speech to form a sentence.

1. At this point we must begin with the simple sentence, because combining individual statements into clauses and combining clauses to construct sentences are the same, whereas combining the parts of speech into a simple sentence is quite different. Included in the first are conjunctions and their rules, and whatever substitutes for them. Included in the second are prepositions.

The crux of the matter concerns the type of combination, its degree, and how much has been combined. In speech, as in everything else, there are only two types of combination, organic and mechanical, i.e., an inner fusion and an external adjoining of parts. This distinction, however, is not absolute, since one often seems to shade off into the other. Often a causal or adversative particle seems merely additive. In such cases it has lost or even abandoned its true content. But often an additive term becomes decisive, and it may then be said to have been enhanced or made emphatic. In this way a qualitative difference becomes quantitative. Often, however, this transposition is only apparent, and the interpreter must always refer back to the original meaning. Often, too, apparent transpositions are due to the fact that the extent or the object of the connection have not been correctly identified. Thus one should not decide about a given case until all other questions have been considered.

XXII. a. An organic connection may be more or less cohesive, but one should never suppose that it has lost all its meaning, as is sometimes done when statements which have been combined do not seem to belong together. But ( $\alpha$ ) the last clause before the particle can be a mere addition, and therefore the connective terms refer back to the main clause. Or the first clause after the connective term may be merely introductory, such that the connection refers to the major thoughts which follow. Of course, in order to specify the extent of a given connection, these dependent clauses should be changed into parenthetical statements (Zwischensätze). The degree to which this procedure can be applied varies according to the style of the work. The more free the style, the more the author must rely on the reader. (β) Often, however, the connection does not refer to the last major thought but to a whole series of thoughts. Otherwise entire sections could not be connected. In writings with well-defined divisions, the points made in one section may be recapitulated in the course of moving to another, and the connection becomes an entire sentence which includes as well the main contents of the section which is to follow. More ponderous constructions may contain additions and repetitions, as well as elements that ought not to have been carried over. But even in more flowing constructions the reader must pay attention to the transitions. Therefore, a general overview of the text is doubly necessary before a given point can be understood.

b. That simply adjoining two statements can, as it were, become emphatic is due to the fact that all our organic connective terms (denn; weil; wenn) have evolved from particles that originally related solely to space and time. Thus it becomes possible that even today particles can be enhanced in their meanings. The canon, then, is based on the fact that one ought never presuppose that an author has merely tacked the whole together. Mere connection predominates in descriptions and narratives, but even there not completely, for this would make the writer nothing more than a transcriber. When the author is not a mere transcriber, mere additions can only be in the service of organic connections, that is, they are enclosed in them, follow from them, or lead to them. Therefore, even if no organic connection is evident, it must be implicit. $^{5}$

XXIII. 5. Application to the New Testament

1. Even when a writer thinks in the language he uses, he frequently relies on his mother tongue in conceiving the work. Moreover, the combination of thoughts is already included in this initial conception, and so special attention is to be directed to the mixture of Hebrew and Greek.

2. This is all the more important because the two languages are so different.

a. Due to their lack of education, the New Testament writers could not appropriate the richness of the Greek language, nor could they by casual listening catch the significance of the different types of connectives. Nonetheless, they sometimes used these along with those they knew well.

b. Consequently, Greek signs which correspond in certain respects were readily considered fully equivalent.

3. It is therefore necessary to construct a whole from the Greek meanings of a sign and from the corresponding Hebraic ones and to make his judgment on this basis.

4. A loose style of writing permits extensive latitude in the use of these elements because the sentences themselves are joined together with little art.

5. The great differences among the New Testament writers in this respect are not to be overlooked. Paul works from the Greek most of all; John the least.

6. The reference works are poorly constructed for these purposes. It is especially important to refer to New Testament dictionaries in conjunction with dictionaries for the Septuagint. Above all, it is important to pay close attention ever to those passages that present no difficulties, for otherwise there is no way to assess the range of usages that are allowable. Failure to do this frequently causes errors.

7. Here I especially want to mention (for I forgot to include it under 4. a., above) that there are also subjective connections, namely, those that give reasons why something has previously been asserted. Since these combinations are indistinguishable in form from objective ones, they are often taken as a restriction of the meaning of a mere transition.

8. The problem of determining what parts of speech hold a sentence together is resolved by the interplay of several considerations.

9. In referring back to the general content, the leading ideas are of primary importance. In considering how the statements are put together, the subjects and predicates, in short, the material element, are the key.

10. In the immediate context the way in which the formal elements have been put together is the key; that is, the construction explains the particles, and vice versa.

11. In the succeeding material one must pay attention to coordinating and subordinating forms of combination.

12. The application must make good sense. The final determination must always be based on a more impartial reconstruction.

13. With respect to combinations within the sentence itself, the most difficult elements are the prepositions and the parts of speech immediately dependent upon them.

14. It makes no difference whether the sentence consists of only a subject and predicate or has a copula as well. In either case the immediate combination should not be mistaken. Even when a sentence is expanded by means of adjectives and adverbs, it forms a whole centered on its subject and predicate. The preposition, however, gives the verb a more precise determination, that is, it indicates how the object is related to the verb. The genitive, status constructus, provides a more precise determination of the subject. The meaning [Sinn] of a preposition is easily determined by reference to the subject and object. The material element is decisive.

15. In the New Testament Hebraicizing tendencies predominate. Therefore, the interpreter must always have in mind the corresponding Hebrew forms.

Part 2: Technical Interpretation

1. Both technical and grammatical interpretation begin with a general overview of a text designed to grasp its unity and the major features of its composition. But in technical interpretation the unity of the work, its theme, is viewed as the dynamic principle impelling the author, and the basic features of the composition are viewed as his distinctive nature, revealing itself in that movement.

(Note: Unity of the work. —Its organization is often merely external and vague. Can be destroyed. At other times the organization is deliberately obscured. The more unified the work, the more artistic it is, and vice versa. The artistic quality of a work is not to be judged solely by its language, for example, in dialogues and letters. —Extremely loose and extremely tight writing are outside the scope of interpretation. —Preliminary task: to know in advance the aim of a work, its circle, and its ideas.)

The unity of the work is to be found in the way the sphere of language has been grammatically constructed. The chief features of composition are to be found in the way the connections between the thoughts have been constructed. Technical interpretation attempts to identify what has moved the author to communicate. Objective differences, such as whether the treatment is popular or scientific, are functions of this motivating principle. Nonetheless, an author organizes his thought in his own peculiar way, and this peculiar way is reflected in the arrangement he chooses. Likewise, an author always has secondary ideas which are determined by his special character. Thus the distinctiveness of an author may be recognized by the secondary ideas that distinguish him from others. To recognize an author in this way is to recognize him as he has worked with language. To some extent he initiates something new in the language by combining subjects and predicates in new ways. Yet to some extent he merely repeats and transmits the language he has received. Likewise, when I know his language, I recognize how the author is a product of the language and stands under its potency. These two views, then, are only two ways of looking at the same thing.

2. The ultimate goal of technical interpretation is nothing other than a development of the beginning, that is, to consider the whole of the author's work in terms of its parts and in every part to consider the content as what moved the author and the form as his nature moved by that content.

When I have exhausted the meaning of every part of the text, there is nothing left to be understood. Moreover, it is self-evident that the relative distinction between understanding the parts and understanding the whole is mediated by the fact that each part is to be treated in the same way as the whole. The aim, however, can be achieved only by holding these two considerations together. Although much of a text can be understood by grammatical interpretation alone, grammatical interpretation cannot grasp how the work is a necessary undertaking of the author, since a sense for this necessity emerges only if the genesis of the text is never lost from view.

3. The goal of technical interpretation should be formulated as the complete understanding of style.

We are accustomed to restrict the term “style” to the way language is handled. But thoughts and language are intertwined, and an author’s distinctive way of treating the subject is manifested by his organization of his material and by his use of language.

Since a person always has numerous ideas, the development of any specific one involves accepting something and excluding something else. — Yet when an idea does not develop from the distinctive character of the author, but is acquired by study or by custom, or is cultivated for its effect, then there is mannerism, and mannerism is always poor style.

4. The goal of technical interpretation can only be approximated.

Despite all our progress we are still far from the goal. There are still conflicts over Homer, and the three tragedians still cannot be perfectly distinguished. $^{6}$ — Not only do we never understand an individual view [Anschauung] exhaustively, but what we do understand is always subject to correction. This becomes evident when we consider that, beyond doubt, the best test is the attempt to imitate an author. But since imitation is so rarely successful and since higher criticism is still embroiled in disputes, we know we are quite far from our goal.

5. Before technical interpretation can begin, one must learn the way the author received his subject matter and the language, and whatever else can be known about the author's distinctive manner [Art und Weise] of writing.

This first task includes learning about the state of a given genre when the author began to write. The second includes learning about the use of language current in this area and related areas. Consequently, exact understanding in this regard requires knowing about related literature current in that era as well as earlier models of style. In technical interpretation there is no substitute for such comprehensive and systematic research.

Learning about the author's manner of writing is a laborious task, and the easiest way to gain such knowledge is to turn to secondary sources. These works, however, make judgments which must be assessed by acts of interpretation. Consequently, reliance on such distant works is to be avoided. As aids for understanding, biographical sketches of authors were originally included in editions of their works, but they usually neglected discussing the question of literary models. Certainly a useful prolegomenon will give the most necessary information about the other two points.

On the basis of this background knowledge and the initial overview of the work, the interpreter develops a provisional conception in terms of which the distinctiveness of the author is to be sought.

6. From the moment it begins, technical interpretation involves two methods: a divinatory and a comparative. Since each method refers back to the other, the two should never be separated.

By leading the interpreter to transform himself, so to speak, into the author, the divinatory method seeks to gain an immediate comprehension of the author as an individual. The comparative method proceeds by subsuming the author under a general type. It then tries to find his distinctive traits by comparing him with the others of the same general type. Divinatory knowledge is the feminine strength in knowing people; comparative knowledge, the masculine.

Each method refers back to the other. The divinatory is based on the assumption that each person is not only a unique individual in his own right, but that he has a receptivity to the uniqueness of every other person.

This assumption in turn seems to presuppose that each person contains a minimum of everyone else, and so divination is aroused by comparison with oneself. But how is it possible for the comparative method to subsume a person under a general type? Obviously, either by another act of comparison (and this continues into infinity) or by divination.

The two methods should never be separated. Divination becomes certain only when it is corroborated by comparisons. Without this confirmation, it always tends to be fanatical. But comparison does not provide a distinctive unity. The general and the particular must interpenetrate, and only divination allows this to happen.

7. The idea of the work, as the will which leads to the actual composition, can be understood only by the joint consideration of two factors: the content of the text and its range of effects.

The content itself does not dictate how it must be treated. As a rule the theme of the work is easy to identify, even if it is not explicitly stated. But for that very reason we can be misled. — What is usually called the “aim” of the work in the strict sense of the word is a different matter entirely. It is often quite external, and it exercises only a limited influence on a few passages. This influence can usually be accounted for from the character of the people who were being addressed. But if one knows who these people were and what effect these passages were to have on them, then, since these factors determine the composition of the work, the interpreter knows everything that is necessary.

Notes

1. The two classical philologists with whose work Schleiermacher takes issue here and elsewhere. In 1829 he delivered two addresses before the Royal Prussian Academy: "On the Concept of Hermeneutics, with reference to F. A. Wolf's Instruction and Ast's Textbook." Cf. Friedrich Ast, Grundlinien der Grammatik: Hermeneutik und Kritik (Landshut, 1808); Friedrich August Wolf, Darstellung der Altertumswissenschaft nach Begriff, Umfang, Zweck und Wert (Berlin, 1807).

2. Cf. Christian Wolff in his Vernünftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes (see bibl.), chs. 10, 11, 12, offered a brief treatment of the problems of textual understanding within the framework of logic. Since philosophical texts were believed not to offer any special hermeneutical problems, they were excluded from consideration by the Enlightenment theoreticians. Thus Chladenius (see bibl.) insists (§ 187) that in philosophy we do not need the art of interpretation, since we can rely immediately on our power of thinking in order to judge whether a philosophical statement is true or false. For Schleiermacher, on the other hand, all understanding is in need of critical examination and reconstructing.

3. Historical and philological methods of interpreting the Holy Scriptures were applied in the eighteenth century by J. A. Turrentinus (De sacra scripturae interpretandae methodo tractatus bipartitus, 1728) and by J. S. Semler (Abhandlung von freier Untersuchung des Canon, 1771–75). Orthodox and pietistic theologians opposed such historical interpretation on principle and advanced instead the notion of an immediate illumination while interpreting the Scriptures.

4. On the history of theological and juristic hermeneutics, see H.-G. Gadamer's article in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, ed. by J. Ritter (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974) vol. 3, and the literature cited therein (1061–73).

5. Schleiermacher's outline here is unclear, and the text has been outlined by the translators. (Translator's note)

6. The conflict over Homer was sparked by F. A. Wolf's Prolegomena ad Homerum (Halle, 1794). In this piece Wolf advances the thesis that the works traditionally ascribed to Homer (the Iliad and the Odyssey) originated in six different eras and represent the work of several authors. Schleiermacher is referring to the three ancient tragedians, Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripedes. (Translator's note)